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International economic sanctions appear to be a common and recurring feature of political 
interactions between states. In particular, the United States is the country which has most 
frequently applied negative economic sanctions after World War II. In a parallel way, several 
measures, imposed by a multilateral organisation like the United Nations have taken place 
in recent years. This paper provides, through a gravity model approach, an estimation of the 
impact of economic negative sanctions on international trade.  
First, the study reports panel gravity estimates of bilateral trade between the U.S. and 49 
target countries over the period 1960-2000, inclusive. The results show that extensive and 
comprehensive sanctions have a large negative impact on bilateral trade, while this is not the 
case for limited and moderate sanctions. A second estimation focuses on the impact of 
unilateral U.S. sanctions on bilateral trade volume between target countries and the other G-
7 countries over the same period. The results show that unilateral extensive sanctions have a 
large negative impact, while limited and moderate ones induce a slight positive effect on other 
G-7 countries bilateral trade. Thus, in the first case the hypothesis of negative ‘network 
effects’ is confirmed, while in the latter the sanctions-busting argument should be defended. In 
both estimations, however, multilateral sanctions demonstrate a large negative impact on trade 
flows.  
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International economic sanctions appear to be a common and recurring 
feature in political interactions between states. The United States, in particular, 
has been the major country imposing economic sanctions after World War II. 
In a parallel way, several sanctions imposed by a multilateral organisation like 
the United Nations have been used in recent years and some of them are still 
in force. In fact, since the Berlin Wall fell, sanctions have become a common 
instrument of the United Nations Security Council.  
The phenomenon of international negative sanctions is generally studied 
in relation to its effectiveness. Many scholars have devoted their efforts to 
distinguishing characteristics of degrees of success and failure of the economic 
punishment
1. However, the efficacy of sanctions as an instrument of foreign 
policy is still in great doubt. One of the main features in this kind of works is 
the focus on the costs of sanctions. The common rationale behind the 
imposition of these measures is that the higher are the costs for the target 
countries the higher will be the probability that their government behaviour 
could be affected because of welfare losses. Boycotts and embargoes, for 
instance, should deprive the target country of some of the gains of trade and 
therefore induce a lower welfare. The costs for target countries are commonly 
assumed to be positively related with the degree of integration with sender 
country. The more the economies are integrated, the more the economic 
interactions should be affected. On the other hand, the sender country could 
also be affected by imposing sanctions. In fact, commercial and financial 
linkages with target country agents are threatened, suspended or blocked.  
Another main feature is the focus on the behaviour of third countries. In 
case of multilateral sanctions, it is often argued that the economic punishment 
should be more effective, since more countries are involved in a co-operative 
and coercive behaviour. Whenever sanctions are unilaterally imposed, the 
impact could be questionable. On one hand, third countries agents, both public 
and private, may capture the gains of diverted trade. On the other hand, the 
expected negative effects of sanctions could spill-over to third countries.       
This paper deals with these aspects of negative sanctions. Firstly, it 
focuses on the impact on bilateral trade between the U.S., as the main sender 
country of the recent years, and target countries. Secondly it examines the 
impact on third countries, supposed to be competitors of the U.S. Finally , it 
analyses the effects  of multilateral sanctions. In particular, through a panel 
gravity approach, this study provides an estimation of the impact of economic 
negative sanctions on international bilateral trade flows. The paper is organised 
as follows: (a) a first part is devoted to defining sanctions and predicting their 
                                                 
1 For examples of studies on the effectiveness of sanctions see among others Baldwin 
(1985), Hufbauer et al. (1990), Martin (1992), Van Bergeijk (1989,1994,1995), Pape 
(1997), Bonetti (1998), Mastanduno (1999), Drezner (2000).   3 3   
impact on trade; (b) a second part deals with the description of the gravity 
model used in the estimation; (c) data, estimation and results are presented for 
the U.S. vis-à-vis 49 target countries; (d) a second estimation on bilateral trade 
between other G-7 countries and the same panel of target countries is 
described; (e) results of a counterfactual experiment are presented; (f) other 
recent empirical works on the same topic are mentioned.     4 4 
 
1. DEFINING SANCTIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON TRADE. 
 
Scholars usually distinguish between negative and positive sanctions. 
Negative sanctions are the best-known economic instruments of diplomacy. 
They are imposed in order to inflict an economic damage to one or more 
countries. Otherwise, positive sanctions are measures devoted to foster co-
operation among some countries. Since this study deals with the impact of 
international negative sanctions on trade, for simplicity the expression 
‘economic sanctions’ will be used to indicate roughly only negative sanctions. 
As it is common in the existing literature, by the expression ‘sender’ and 
‘target’ I denote respectively the country that imposes sanctions and the 
country that receives the economic punishment. It is possible to look at 
economic sanctions regarding: (i) objective; (ii) actors involved; (iii) object of 
sanctions. 
As regards objectives of sanctions, following Barber (1979) it is possible to 
group them into three categories. There are ‘primary objectives’ concerned 
with the actions and behaviour of governments against whom the sanctions are 
directed. The ‘secondary objectives’ are related to status, behaviour and 
expectations of governments imposing sanctions. Finally the ‘tertiary 
objectives’ are concerned with the broader international considerations, 
relating either to the structure of international system as a whole, or to some 
parts of it. These three categories do not exclude each other but can coexist 
and overlap in some cases. 
Another way to look at sanctions is to note the number of states involved. 
Most of the times the initiative in imposing international sanctions rests on one 
government. Indeed they can take shape of both unilateral and multilateral. In 
the first case, sanctions are imposed by only one country against a target 
country. In the second case, sanctions are imposed by more than one country. 
On one hand, it is possible that other countries follow a ‘promoter’ country. 
Otherwise, the choice of an economic punishment can be adopted within the 
framework of an international organisation. 
Looking at the object of sanctions, we can distinguish three kinds of 
sanctions: boycotts, embargoes and financial sanctions. A boycott is a 
restriction of imports of one or more goods from the target country. It takes 
place to lower the demand for certain products from the target country. 
Moreover, it attempts to reduce the target’s foreign exchange earnings and 
therefore its ability to purchase goods. It also aims to induce a damage to a 
particular industry or sector of the target country. They are usually criticised as 
ineffective because target countries are able to find alternative markets or 
arrange triangular purchases to circumvent import controls. Otherwise an 
embargo restricts exports of certain products to the target country. This is the 
most common technique. The prohibition on exports may be partial or 
complete. It is usually enforced by a system of export licenses and supporting 
measures. Finally, financial sanctions restrict or suspend lending and investing   5 5 
into target economy. They also impose additional restrictions on international 
payments in order to prevent sanctions-busting. Moreover foreign assets of the 
target economy may be frozen.  
Sanctions depress trade but, as other quantitative restrictions, they are 
characterised by a phenomenon of rent-seeking. The graph below simply 
describes the impact of sanctions on trade volume and prices. Let the curve D 
represent target country import demand curve. The target country is assumed 
to be a small open economy and, therefore it cannot affect the world price but 
it is a price taker on the world market. Therefore, the supply curve is a flat line. 
In the absence of any impediments or transportation costs the perfect 
competition equilibrium will be reached at point E. Consumers purchase the 
quantity q1 at the world price pw.. Suppose now that a sender country imposes 
an export embargo on exports to the target country, restricting them until q*. 
The vertical line represents the quantitative restriction. Since the embargo 
restricts supply it also raises import prices to p* in the importing country. The 
wedge in the price (p*- pw.) reflects the quantitative restriction. A rent that can 
be distributed either to the government or to the private agents equals (p* - 
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Figure 1. The Impact on trade 
Sinc
e it is enforced trough a system of licenses, an export embargo is operationally 
indistinguishable from a Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) and includes a rent 
that either pertains to the foreign exporters or is taken over by the 
government. In fact, the rent could be captured by the sender country’s 
government if exporting licenses were competitively auctioned off for their 
premium value. Otherwise, the free issuing of licenses would transfer the rent   6 6 
to exporters who managed to obtain them. As Jones (1984) pointed out 
regarding the political economy of a VER, exporters are likely to collude in 
order to capture the monopoly rents. At the same time an important 
implication is that the supply restriction requires state-sponsored collusive 
activity with cartel discipline maintained by the administrative powers of the 
government. Moreover, the shortfall in supply caused by the embargo could 
also benefit exporters not involved in the conflict between sender and target 
country. Third countries producers, in fact, could allow non-restraining 
exporters to increase deliveries to the importing country expanding their 
market share. However, like in any other trade restriction, the greatest burden 
is imposed on consumers of importing country, i.e. the target country. In fact 




2. SOME KEY THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS  
 
There are several ways economists have analysed the phenomenon of 
negative sanctions. This section is a brief review of the main contributions. 
Interest in sanctions is diversified upon some characteristics: the response of 
economy sanctioned, the nature and importance of goods included in sanctions 
list, and the role of business and interest groups among others. 
In a seminal work, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1976) note that the 
phenomenon of a trade embargo on a country’s imports can be analysed as a 
market-disruption phenomenon. To investigate the optimal response policy 
intervention required when a trade disruption occurs, they consider a two-
commodity (exportable and importable) model of international trade. Then 
they assume a two-period horizon and also include adjustment costs. The 
results are applied to a situation when an embargo is imposed. The probability 
that an embargo can take place is an increasing function of the importing level 
of the importing country (the target country). The rationale for this assumption 
is that the probability may depend upon ‘import dependence’ of the importer. 
In this case, the optimal response of target country should be a trade tariff if 
there were no adjustment costs, and a trade tariff plus production tax-cum-
subsidy if there were adjustment costs. Optimal response of an economy does 
not depend only upon government choices (e.g. tariffs or subsidy), but also 
upon the behaviour of individuals consumers and producers.  
Tolley and Wilman (1977) also consider the response of private individual 
agents. They use a partial equilibrium framework to analyse the impact of a 
trade disruption threat. First, they focus on the objective of trade to allow for 
the presence of an embargo threat. Given an embargo frequency and a 
probability distribution of embargo length the objective is the maximisation of 
expected welfare. Dividing goods in ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ and noting how short-
run demand curve is less elastic than the long-run curve, they look at the 
private decisions to face the embargo threats. Particularly domestic suppliers   7 7 
and demanders will make decisions based on expected price taking into 
account embargo and non-embargo periods. In non-embargo periods domestic 
suppliers will increase production and demanders will decrease consumption. 
The marginal value of consumption raises less than the marginal cost of 
production. Furthermore, unemployment and foreign policy externalities are 
considered: they provide reasons for public interventions to reduce imports in 
non-embargo periods by a greater amount than occurs under private decisions. 
Expressions are derived for optimal adjustment, including an optimal tariff and 
an equivalent optimal quota. Particularly an optimal tariff is proportional to 
foreign dependence, inversely proportional to elasticity of external embargo 
loss, varies directly with embargo probability and depends more complexly on 
other parameters.  
The importance and the distinction between private and public policy 
choices are also analysed by Van Bergeijk (1994, ch.6). He develops an 
expected utility model that deals with the short-term consequences of trade 
uncertainty due to boycotts and embargoes that can be imposed unexpectedly 
and raise the level of uncertainty in trade patterns. The model focuses on a 
small open economy that produces, consumes and trades two goods, whose 
price is set exogenously. Its utility function is strictly concave. Economic 
agents take into account the possibility of some trade disruption due to 
diplomatic climate and, therefore, they take decisions about the extent of their 
specialisation. This choice will be a point between a situation of complete 
autarky and absolute free trade situation. A deterioration of diplomatic climate 
induces a lowering of free trade. The model shows that in a centrally-planned 
economy  vis-à-vis  a market economy the extent of specialisation is lower. 
Looking at the nature of goods a market economy will specialise more in 
goods with a relative comparative advantage.  
A simple two-commodity model is also presented by Frey (1984, ch. 6). 
He considers the production possibility frontier of economy and community 
homothetic indifference curves. The two commodities are internationally 
traded at international prices. The negative impact on income depends on 
losses of gains of trade. More in detail, this negative effect depends on the 
production possibility curve and the indifference curves of target country 
consumers. The more rigid is the production structure of an economy the 
larger is the welfare loss. Likewise, the more inflexible are consumers’ 
preferences the higher the loss will be. Flexibility of demand and supply curves 
is strictly linked with the nature of goods. The larger is the importance of a 
particular good for an economy the more rigid is its demand curve.  
The significance of the nature and characteristics of goods is the focus of 
Gray (1986). He points out the relevance of considering non-competitive 
goods in trade warfare. First, he defines four categories of non competitive 
goods: a) a first ‘pure’ category of goods that cannot be produced in the target 
country because the essential production factor is a natural resource not 
available; b) a second ‘pure’ category of good that cannot be produced because 
of lack of a production-prerequisite other than natural resources (technology,   8 8 
human capital); c) a hybrid category that requires a production factor available 
only in limited quantities. Its supply is positive but almost rigid; a d) goods for 
which domestic capacity does not exist because the limited size of the local 
market precludes the availability of important economies of scale. The results 
of the model show that per-unit average gains from trade from the importation 
of non-competitive goods are likely to exceed those derived from trade in 
competitive goods. Indeed, he argues that the only way to inflict a severe 
economic punishment is to be able to withhold non-competitive imports from 
the target state. In fact, if competitive goods are withheld the target economy 
moves over its production possibility to a worse position, but the magnitude of 
damage will be far less than that induced if restrictions on non-competitive 
goods are imposed.  
Another topic that has been emphasised is the role of interest groups into 
the managing of sanctions. Lunborg (1987) argues that an export embargo is 
operationally indistinguishable from a Voluntary Export Restraint (VER). The 
distinction between a VER and an embargo is characterised by a) the political 
motivation; b) the will of sender country to punish the target country. 
Furthermore, he also notes that quantitatively effects on importing country are 
expected to be different: in the case of a VER, welfare in the importing 
country is expected to increase; in the case of an export embargo it is expected 
to fall. The crucial consideration is that the export contraction is usually 
imposed on goods and commodities that cannot be produced in the importing 
country (now the target country). Therefore, as in the case of the VER, the 
analysis of the export embargo includes a rent. Taking into consideration the 
effect both on target and sender an optimal solution should be the reduction of 
exports at the point where exports’ monopoly profits are maximised.  
In the same optic Bayard et al. (1983) have pointed out that the potential 
economic effectiveness of sanctions depends on their oligopoly power in 
restricting sales and raising prices. The larger is the share of exports controlled 
by a cartel of exporters, the easier it is to inflict damage. Since the costs of 
reaching an agreement depends on the number and size of participating 
exporters, the smaller the number of agents in the cartel and the larger their 
collective share of total world exports of the commodity, the easier it will be to 
reach an agreement. Thus, sanctions are likely to be more effective if they do 
not need to rely on many small exporters to control a large share of world 
exports.  
In that regard an interesting interpretation is given by Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg (1988). They argue that sanctions are imposed in order to respond 
to an internal political pressure by interest groups. Thus, the types of sanctions 
observed are likely to be those that serve the interests of influential pressure 
groups within the polity of sender country and are unlikely to be designed in 
order to impose maximum damage to target countries. Since sanctions can be 
interpreted as a signal towards the opposition groups in target countries, 
therefore groups that are interested in a political change in target countries can 
ally with other groups that may benefit from sanctions. The economic harm   9 9 
would not be the crucial factor in determining the package of measures. The 
authors, also, point out that this approach might be used to explain why sender 
countries restrict imports to target countries rather than export to it. Leidy 
(1989) criticised this position, arguing that Kaempfer and Lowenberg failed to 
incorporate some essential information about the legal, institutional and 
strategic framework in which sanctions decisions are made. In particular, he 
noted that evidence clearly indicates that there is an unequivocal bias against 
the use of import restrictions in favour of export controls. On the path of 
public choice approach, Dorussen and Mo (2001) developed a model of the 
well-known war-of-attrition game in which ending sanctions becomes the 
objective of interstate bargaining. States are not treated as unitary decision 
makers so as to introduce explicitly the effects of domestic politics. They argue 
that sanctions endure because governments commit themselves to domestic 
institutions. These institutions function as constraints in international 
bargaining. Thus, they take into consideration the literature on two-level games 
in addition to the public-choice perspective on international sanctions. 
 
3. THE GRAVITY MODEL 
 
As indicated above, this study uses a gravity approach to explain the 
impact of sanctions on trade. The empirical evidence based on gravity equation 
affirms that bilateral trade flows are related to the size of countries and 
geographic variables. Particularly, bilateral trade is supposed to be positively 
related to the size of countries and negatively related to distance between them. 
These factors have analogies respectively with the attraction force and 
resistance force in Newtonian physics, giving the gravity model its name. The 
gravity model explains bilateral aggregate trade flows by using a single log-
linear equation: 
 
ln TRADEijt = β0 + β1 ln GDPit + β2 ln GDPjt + β3 ln POPit + β4 ln POPjt +β5 ln 
DISTij + β6At + uijt 
 
where TRADEijt denotes bilateral trade flows between country i and country j 
at time t, GDPit and GDPjt country i and j’s gross domestic products, POPit 
POPjt their populations, DISTi the distance between countries, and finally At a 
variety of other factors (commonly dummy variables) either aiding or resisting 
trade between countries and uij the usual random error term. Another common 
specification takes GDP and GDP per capita instead of GDP and population. 
In the traditional specification of gravity equation prices are not considered.   
The first attempt to apply the gravity equation to trade had been made by 
Isard (1954). Tinbergen (1962) firstly introduced the logarithmic form of the 
model. His purpose was to determine the normal or standard pattern of 
international trade that would prevail in the absence of discriminating trade 
impediments. Linneman (1966) argued that the gravity model is a reduced form   1 10 0 
from a four-equation partial equilibrium model of export supply and import 
demand.  
Albeit its notorious success in empirical works, the gravity equation lacked 
of sound theoretical underpinnings. Firstly Anderson (1979) has provided a 
theoretical explanation for the gravity equation applied to commodities. He 
argued that the gravity equation can be derived by the properties of 
expenditure systems. Helpmann and Krugman (1985, ch. 8) have developed a 
gravity-like equation in a simple model of intra-industry trade. Since economies 
of scale are expected to lead more specialisation the gravity equation will tend 
to fit the trade pattern better, the more important are increasing returns.   
Bergstrand (1985) presents a general equilibrium model of world trade derived 
from utility- and profit-maximising agent behaviour and assuming a single 
factor of production in each country. Thus, the trade flow depends upon the 
resources availability for a given year as well as trade barriers among all pairs of 
countries. Therefore he derives a gravity model making certain simplifying 
assumptions. Furthermore, Bergstrand (1989) has extended his previous work 
to incorporate the Heckscher-Olin factor-proportion theory and verifies the 
Linder hypothesis, according to which countries with similar per capita 
incomes will have similar demands. Deardoff (1995) derived bilateral trade 
from two cases of the Heckscher-Olin model and Evenett and Keller (1998) 
analysed the Heckscher-Olin theory and the Increasing Returns theory, by 
examining whether they account for the empirical success of the gravity 
equation.  
I estimate an augmented gravity model adding to the standard model some 
dummy variables in order to distinguish the effects of political conflicts. The 
estimated equation is: 
 
ln TRADEijt = β0 + β1 ln GDPit + β2 ln GDPjt + β3 ln POPit + β4 ln POPjt +β5 ln 
DISTij + β6 LMSANC + β7 XSANC + β8 MULTSANC+ β9 INTERWAR + β10 
INTRAWAR + uijt 
 
In evaluating sanctions, some distinctions should be made. First, sanctions are 
not all equal. Most of them imply trade restrictions to reduce trade-exports or 
imports or both; But some of them imply financial restrictions too. In this 
study financial sanctions are also considered and included in the same dummy 
variables. In fact they may also reduce trade by denying investment, foreign 
exchange or credit to the target country or by raising its cost of credit. In a 
parallel way, we can distinguish them regarding the magnitude and the severity 
of restrictions. There are several examples of minor financial and trade 
sanctions, and also cases of comprehensive trade and financial ones such as 
those against Iran or Nicaragua. I distinguish two categories. For simplicity, 
partial trade restrictions and financial sanctions will be included in ‘moderate’, 
and extensive trade and financial restrictions will be considered ‘extensive’. 
Therefore LMSANC and XSANC denote moderate and extensive sanctions 
respectively.    1 11 1 
Sanctions often are expected to be more effective if taken at multilateral level. 
When other countries than the U.S. impose sanctions, the trade linkages are 
expected to be more worsened, and therefore sanctions more effective. 
MULTSANC denotes the situation where more countries are involved. 
In the gravest cases sanctions could not be disentangled from military 
disputes that also affect trade linkages. In many cases the target country is 
involved in a military conflict with a third country. Take Ethiopia under the 
Mengistu government. The U.S. sanctions had been imposed in 1976 while it 
was about to begin a war in 1977. In a few other cases economic sanctions are 
intertwined with military interventions. The former Yugoslavia for instance 
was already under sanctions regime when war occurred with the U.S. active 
participation in 1996. Moreover, trade can be limited also by the self-interested 
actions of businessmen, even without government sanctions. Entrepreneurs, as 
rational actors, can reduce trade when they see their goods or their lives are 
endangered by military hostilities. At a minimum, they will seek a greater 
margin of profit or more complete insurance coverage to compensate for the 
risk; but these actions raise costs and lower demand, reducing commerce.  
Since wars take many forms in the contemporary era, I adopt a distinction 
that has been developed in the "Correlates of War Project" held at 
Pennsylvania State University. Serious military conflicts between states are 
defined ‘inter-state war’ and armed conflicts and civil wars within states are 
defined ‘intra-state war’. Therefore,  INTERWAR is used to depict the 
situation in which an inter-state war had occurred for the target country and 
INTRAWAR when an intra-state conflict had occurred. Both variables equal 1 
if a war broke out, 0 otherwise. They are also expected to decrease trade. 
 
4. THE DATA, THE ESTIMATION AND THE RESULTS 
 
At the first step the study reports panel gravity estimates of bilateral trade 
between the U.S. and 49 target countries over the period 1960-2000, inclusive. 
The bilateral trade data are taken from OECD Statistical compendium 2001 
and are expressed in nominal dollars. Following the existing literature, I drop 
the observations where recorded bilateral trade is zero. As Baldwin (1994) 
pointed out once panel data are to be used, it is necessary to use real data. 
Therefore, trade data are to be deflated. Following previous studies (Rose, 
1999) I adopt the GDP chain price index to deflate the nominal trade values. It 
measures the average of the prices of the goods and services that are contained 
in the GDP. Since 1996 it has replaced the GDP deflator as the principle index 
reported by the index of the U.S. Department of Commerce
2. Real GDP per 
                                                 
2 The index is available on line at the website of Bureau of Economic analysis of 
Department of commerce. See www.bea.gov   1 12 2 
capita and population figures are primarily taken from the Penn World Table 6
3. 
They are expressed in constant prices (base year 1996). Furthermore I filled the 
missing data by using an extended dataset of the Penn World Tables provided 
by Gleditsch (2002)
4. The panel, however, is unbalanced. 
For the measurement of distance, I use the most common approach in the 
literature, the straight-line distances (expressed in kilometres) between capitals 
of countries. They are implicitly assumed to be the economic centres of a 
country
5. To calculate the distances I used a software tool available on the 
Web
6. Cases on international sanctions
7 are extracted from Hufbauer et al. 
(1990) dataset and from website of Institute of International Economics that 
published an updated version of Hufbauer dataset
8. Further cases are extracted 
by official sources of the U.S. government
9. The United Nations official 
documents archive has been also used
10. Unfortunately because of the lack of 
data some important cases are not considered in the sample
11. The main source 
with regard to interstate and intrastate wars is the dataset of Correlates of War 
project available on the website of Pennsylvania State University
12.  
Analysing panel data imposes to make a choice between the random 
effects estimator and the fixed effects one. The random effects model requires 
that intercept terms and the error terms are mutually independent. It is 
consistent if the above-mentioned orthogonality conditions are fulfilled. The 
fixed effects approach is conditional upon the values of intercept terms and it 
implies that individuals in the sample are considered ‘one of a kind’. This 
appropriation should be the most appropriate when individuals denote 
countries (Verbeek, 2000). The fixed effects model, in fact, should be more 
useful in capturing some unobservable country-specific factors. For instance in 
terms of standard trade models such factors might reflect the relative 
preference that an importing country’s consumer has for an exporter’s goods. 
In addition other fixed factors such as historical links, cultural similarities that 
are difficult to quantify are captured by each trading-pair intercept (Wall, 1999).  
Egger (2002) and Matyas (1997) also suggest that the fixed effect model 
performs better in gravity-approach analyses. 
                                                 
3 Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, 
Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), 
October 2002. 
4 the dataset is available on line at the website 
http://www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdataoct02.htm 
5 In the case of Brazil Rio de Janeiro had been considered instead of Brasilia; in the 
case of South Africa Johannesburg instead of Pretoria. 
6 A distance calculator is available at www.indo.com/distance 
7 See appendix for the list of target countries considered. 
8 See http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/sanctions-timeline.htm 
9 See www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/index.html 
10 see http://www.un.org/sc/committees/sanctions/index.html 
11 Lybia, North Korea, Yugoslavia and Vietnam.  
12 see http://cow2.la.psu.edu/   1 13 3 
The decision between the fixed effects model and the random effects 
model can be based on the Hausman test. It tests whether the fixed effects and 
random effects are significantly different. A significant difference suggests that 
the null hypothesis of no correlation between explanatory variables and 
individual effects is unlikely to hold. In this case the resulting Hausman χ
2 test 
statistic equals 121.99 that is statistically significant. Therefore we reject the 
null hypothesis of no correlation between the intercept terms and explanatory 
variables. However, the random effects estimation is reported in the appendix, 
in comparison with fixed effects results.  
The regression coefficient on a continuous logarithmic variable can be 
interpreted as an elasticity, that is, as the ratio of the percentage change in the 
dependent variable for each one percent change in the independent variable. 
The coefficients of dummy variables have a percentage interpretation. More 
precisely it can be interpreted as a percentage shift in the dependent variable 
when the dummy equals 1 versus when it equals 0, holding all other factors 
fixed. Findings of two regressions are shown in Table 1. In the first one all the 
variables are included less the ‘war’ dummy variables that are in the latter 
regression. The model performed quite well. Most of the results are as 
expected and seem quite reasonable. Firstly, GDP, as expected, has a 
significant impact on trade both in the U.S. and in the target country. Target 
country population has a negative effect. In the fixed effects distances are 
subsumed into the trading-pair intercept. Wall (1999) noted that this is 
particularly important for studies that include the United States, which has 
several economic centres on and between the two coasts.  
Moderate and limited sanctions, albeit expected to have also a negative 
impact on trade, show a positive coefficient but insignificantly different from 
zero. An explanation for this result could be found in the variety of sanctions 
considered and in their magnitude, since minor and partial restrictions, both on 
trade and financial side, have been included in this category. On the other hand 
extensive and multilateral sanctions surely disrupt bilateral trade. For these 
variables coefficients are always statistically significant. In such a case imposing 
a sanction fosters a decrease in bilateral trade flows by 89 percent. 
Extending the regressions with interstate and intra-state conflicts results 
do not change their signs. Anyway, the interstate war coefficient, albeit 
negative, is not statistically significant while intrastate wars affect negatively 
significantly bilateral trade flows. The impact of intrastate wars however is not 
higher than negative impact of sanctions and, moreover, sanctions coefficients 













Table 1. The impact of sanctions  
   Coeff. 
Standard 
error P-Value  Coeff. 
Standard 
error P-Value 
LnGDPi  1.99 0.94 0.04 2.02 0.94 0.03 
LnGDPj  0.66 0.1 0.00  0.65 0.1 0.00 
Ln POPi  -4.9  3.11  0.12  -4.78  3.11  0.13 
Ln POPj  -0.41  0.19  0.03  -0.4  0.19  0.03 
LnDIST  Dropped 
LMSANC  0.13 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.08 0.08 
XSANC  -0.89 0.17 0.00 -0.87 0.17 0.00 
MULTSANC  -0.82 0.13 0.00 -0.82 0.13 0.00 
INTERWAR  - - -  0.00  0.15  0.98 
INTRAWAR  - - -  -0.23  0.08  0.01 
Constant  44.3 32.49 0.17 41.44  32.54  0.2 
Observations   1876    1876 
R
2  within     0.17    0.18 
R
2  between   0.58    0.57 
R2 Overall        0.42        0.42   1 15 5 
5. DOES SANCTIONS-BUSTING WORK? 
 
An argument that is often remarked analysing the sanctions is the 
possibility that the sender country should face a phenomenon of trade 
diversion. It has been argued that sanctions-busting is always likely to occur. 
Sanctions are able to create powerful incentives for evasion. Trade can be 
diverted trough new ingenious relationships devised by domestic and third-
country firms. Particularly Drezner (2000) distinguishes if the sender country is 
unable to enforce the application of sanctions due to defections by private 
rent-seeking actors (sanctions-busting) or by nation-states (backsliding). This 
phenomenon is often indicated as one of the main reason of failure of the 
economic punishment. Take Nicaragua in 80
s under the Sandinista 
government. After the United States, under the Reagan administration, 
imposed sanctions on it, other western countries disagreed with American 
policy. Canada, for instance, permitted Nicaragua to move its Miami-based 
foreign trade office to Toronto, stating that it had ‘a perfect right’
13 to sell 
Nicaragua anything it wants to buy. This is the rationale that very often led to 
diplomatic efforts for multilateral co-operation in sanctions enforcing. It is also 
behind the Helms-Burton Act and the Iran/Libya Sanctions Act, which 
threatens to punish third-country corporations that conduct business in Cuba, 
Iran, and Libya. Therefore, according to this point of view it could be argued 
that U.S. competitors trade with U.S.-targeted countries capturing the business 
when the United States imposes unilateral sanctions. Hufbauer (1997) found 
positive evidence of this hypothesis. 
A different argument is expounded by Van Bergeijk (1995). He points out 
that, after sanctions have been imposed, changes in the world economic system 
occur. These changes also influence the economic opportunities of countries 
that are in no way involved in the conflict. These are the ‘network effects’ of 
sanctions. In many cases the impact of boycotts and embargoes does spill-over 
to the trade partners (and to the trade partners’ trade partners and so on). 
Therefore, other countries will suffer from the trade disruption caused by 
sanctions. It would appear obvious that these arguments could be stressed if 
sanctions are unilaterally imposed. When sanctions are multilateral it would be 
expected that the trade disruption phenomenon occurs at least for all countries 
involved in. 
I analyse the effects of sanctions on G-7 countries other than the United 
States. These are supposed to have a similar exporting capability to the United 
States. Trying to capture the presence of this phenomenon I apply the gravity 
equation to a new panel of countries. Particularly, I report panel gravity 
estimates of bilateral merchandise trade between other G-7 countries
14 and the 
49 sanctions-targeted countries over the period 1960-2000, inclusive. The 
gravity equation is exactly the same. As before, the dummy variables denote if 
                                                 
13 Statement by Canadian Foreign Minister Joe Clark, quoted by Hufbauer (1990). 
14 Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom   1 16 6 
the United States imposed the sanctions or not. If other industrialised 
countries evade the sanctions, coefficients are expected to be of opposite sign 
compared to those of the U.S.-bilateral trade flows regression. Effects on 
bilateral trade flows of industrialised countries with target countries are 
assumed to proxy the impact of the U.S. sanctions on third countries bilateral 
trade flows. 
The findings are shown in table 2. All the variables are highly statistically 
significant. The impact of U.S. sanctions on third countries is diversified. 
Limited and moderate sanctions show a slightly positive impact. Roughly, 
other G-7 countries increase their bilateral trade with the U.S. sanctions-
targeted countries. Thus it seems that sanctions-busting works.  
On the other hand, comprehensive and extensive sanctions induce a 
disruption of trade for other countries too. In such a case the network negative 
effects affect other countries’ trade. The estimated negative effect is very large. 
A negative effect is also obviously recorded when sanctions are multilateral. 
Interstate and intrastate wars also affect trade flows, but as in the first 
regression, their impact is lower than sanctions. 
 
Table.2 The impact of sanctions on other G-7 countries bilateral trade 
 Coeff. 
Standard 
error P-Value  Coeff. 
Standard 
error P-Value 
LnGDPi  0.79 0.07 0.00 0.81 0.68 0.00 
LnGDPj  0.86 0.33 0.00 0.85 0.03 0.00 
Ln  POPi  0.79 0.63 0.00 0.78 0.06 0.00 
Ln  POPj  -1.24 0.79 0.00 -1.21 0.08 0.00 
LnDIST  -1.15 0.23 0.00 -1.15 0.02 0.00 
LMSANC  0.16 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.03 0.00 
XSANC  -0.71 0.06 0.00 -0.69 0.06 0.00 
MULTSANC -0.97 0.05 0.00 -0.97 0.05 0.00 
INTERWAR  - - -  -0.08  0.05  0.14 
INTRAWAR  - - -  -0.17  0.03  0.00 
Constant -14.3  0.75  0.00  -14.74  0.75  0.00 
Observations   10950       10950     
R
2 within    0.50       0.51    
R
2 between    0.00       0.00    
R2 Overall     0.10        0.11      1 17 7 
 
6. A COUNTERFACTUAL EXPERIMENT 
 
How much more would countries have traded if sanctions had not been 
imposed? To compute this, I apply the data (GDP, population and distance) in 
the estimated equation, employing the coefficients estimated trough the fixed 
effects model. Through this first calculation I obtain the ‘explained trade’. 
Furthermore I compute the ‘simulated trade’, i.e. the amount that the United 
States and the other G-7 countries would have exchanged without sanctions, 
imposing dummy variables equalling zero. In both calculations I exclude non-
significant coefficients. Thereafter, I  take anti-logs and I compute a ratio. The 
results are shown in table 3, and are divided into the two categories of 
sanctions. Positive signs denote that trade volumes would have been higher 
without sanctions and vice versa.     
 
 
Table.3 A counterfactual experiment 
      U.S. 
other G-7 
countries 
Limited and moderate        
 Unilateral  (U.S.)  -  -0.17 
 Multilateral  0.56  0.56 
Extensive      
 Unilateral  (U.S.)  0.59  0.51 
 Multilateral  0.82  0.81 
Ratio is computed through: (simulated trade-explained trade/simulated trade) 
   
Look at the U.S. imposing unilaterally extensive sanctions. In such a case 
bilateral trade volumes with target countries would have been 59 percent 
higher without the sanctions. The negative ratio for other G-7 countries in case 
of limited and moderate unilateral U.S. sanctions confirms the hypothesis of 
sanctions-busting. In fact, if sanctions had not been imposed other G-7 
countries would have traded less by 17%. Otherwise, in case of unilateral 
extensive measures other G-7 countries would have traded 51 percent more. In 
this case the hypothesis of negative ‘network effects’ is confirmed. Multilateral 
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8. OTHER EMPIRICAL WORKS ABOUT SANCTIONS 
 
In the existing literature there are few works regarding an overall analysis 
of costs provoked by sanctions. Here, I mention the method and the results of 
two recent works. 
Hufbauer et al. (2003, 1997) apply a gravity analysis in order to investigate 
the impact of sanction on the U.S. trade. The main difference between the two 
papers is in the database used. In their more recent work they use Rose’s 
gravity model database, while in the first study a smaller sample of countries 
was included. I briefly quote the most recent work’s method and findings. 
Apart from the standard gravity model variables (GDP, GDP per capita and 
distance as in Rose’s specification), they include several other explanatory 
variables that can be expected to influence trade flows—such as common 
language, common border, and membership in regional trading blocs. 
Moreover dummy variables to denote sanctions are included. Particularly they 
are divided into three categories: limited, moderated and extensive sanctions. 
They considered minor financial, export, cultural, or travel sanctions to be 
"limited". Examples include suspending or reducing bilateral aid, and imposing 
export restrictions on weapons or narrow categories of dual-use technologies. 
Broader trade or financial sanctions were classified as "moderate". The 
"extensive" category is reserved for comprehensive trade and financial 
sanctions such as those against Iraq or Serbia.  
Sometimes, however, a combination of several "moderate" sanctions, such 
as U.S. export controls against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during 
the Cold War, together with denial of MFN status under the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment, were considered "extensive". To evaluate whether sanctions 
continue to adversely affect trade even after they have been lifted (an “after-
life”), they included dummy variables representing cases where sanctions were 
not present in the year under analysis but had been in place at any time during 
the previous 10 years. The analysis focuses on two years, 1995 and 1999
15.  
As expected, extensive sanctions show a large depressing effect on 
bilateral trade flows, and the coefficients are highly significant. Otherwise the 
estimated coefficients for limited and moderate sanctions, however, are not 
statistically significant at the usual levels of confidence. Moreover they find 
little evidence to support the argument that sanctions continue to suppress 
trade after they have been lifted. Furthermore they computed an estimate of 
losses due to sanctions.  
Another recent empirical analysis is that one presented by Askari et al. 
(2003). They measure the economic impact on the United States, some selected 
major target countries, and some third countries – the European Union and 
                                                 
15 The former analysis (Hufbauer et al. 1997) focused on three years, 1985, 1990, 1995 
and on three different sample of countries: 88 pairs of countries, only OECD 
countries, and only U.S.   1 19 9 
Japan. They also employ an augmented gravity model including dummy 
variables to investigate the impact of sanctions on trade. In this study, they 
intend to focus on the determinants of the U.S. trade flows (exports, imports, 
as well as total trade). Moreover, they use different classification or measures 
of the sanction variable to see whether the results are sensitive to different 
classifications. Specifically, they use 19 years (1980-1998) of annual data for the 
U.S. exports, imports, and bilateral trade. They apply an OLS estimation for 
any year considered. Their findings show that the impact of U.S. economic 
sanctions on U.S. trade (bilateral trade, exports alone, or imports alone) is very 
sensitive to how the sanctioned country list is identified and selected. This is 
particularly true for countries specified as targets of U.S. selective economic 
sanctions. For the three different classifications they have used, two of them 
show no consistent statistical significance. Using a sample that includes the 
formerly planned economies that have been long the target of U.S. economic 
sanctions in recent history, they have found that sanctions have a significant 
impact on U.S. exports, imports, and total trade. Furthermore, comprehensive 
economic sanctions have a significant negative impact on U.S. bilateral trade, 
exports, and imports with target countries subject to these sanctions.  
They also investigated whether the sanctions-busting  argument should be 
confirmed. They call it ‘third country effect’. For the group of formerly 
planned economies, their trade (including bilateral trade, exports alone, and 
imports alone) with the E.U. and Japan has been similarly affected by U.S. 
economic sanctions as their trade with the U.S. On the other hand, in the case 
of countries subject to comprehensive economic sanctions imposed by the 
U.S., there is no significant impact on these countries’ trade with the E.U. or 
Japan. In some cases, they found that these sanctions have actually promoted 
trade between these countries and the E.U. or Japan. They interpret this as a 
clear indication of sanctions-busting or (as in their words) third-country effect. 
Van Bergeijk (1994, ch.7) uses also a gravity-approach in order to 
investigate the influence political relations on trade flows. He did not insert 
directly sanctions into the gravity equation. In fact, he constructs an index to 
denote co-operation and hostility between countries that has to be added to 
the standard gravity equation. Negative sanctions enter the construction of the 
index. The rationale of not using binary variables relies on the author’s will to 
allow more differentiation than crude dummy variables deployed in some of 
the earlier studies on trade diplomacy. Hence individual indicators have been 
constructed for the ‘amount’ of conflict between a pair of nations and on the 
other hand on the amount of co-operation between these nations. He develops 
a cross-section gravity model that deals with the bilateral trade flows of 40 
countries in 1986. The findings show that that the diplomatic climate strongly 
influences the pattern of international trade flows. In any case, the results show 
that the contribution of strictly economic variables exceeds the contribution of 
the indicators for the bilateral diplomatic climate.  




By means of a gravity equation I estimated the impact of international 
negative economic sanctions on international trade. Since the U.S. are the most 
important sender of economic sanctions, the study first reports panel gravity 
estimates of bilateral trade between U.S. and 49 target countries. The results 
show that extensive and comprehensive sanctions have a large negative impact 
on bilateral trade, while this is not the case for limited and moderate sanctions. 
Furthermore, since it is often argued that sanctions-busting is always likely to 
occur and that factor also lowers the effectiveness of sanctions, a second 
estimation focuses on the impact of unilateral U.S. sanctions on bilateral trade 
volume between sanctioned countries and the other G-7 countries. The results 
show that unilateral extensive sanctions have a large negative impact, while 
limited and moderate ones induce a slight positive effect on other G-7 
countries aggregate bilateral trade. In the latter case the hypothesis of 
‘sanctions-busting’ works. Otherwise the different argument of negative 
‘network effects’ should be defended. Other countries than the sender could 
experience a trade disruption induced by a unilateral economic punishment. 
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Target countries and years 
Extensive sanctions 
Cuba 1960- 
Dominican Republic  1960-1962 
Grenada 1992-1993 
Iran  1979-2000 
Iraq  1991- 
Nicaragua 1981-1990 
South Africa  1982-1994 
Sudan  1989- 
Uganda  1972-1979 
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)  1965-1979 
Limited and Moderate sanctions 
Angola  1986-1996 
Argentina 1977-1983 
Bolivia 1979-1982 
Brazil 1962-1964,  1977-1984 
Burma (Myanmar)  1988- 
Cameroon 1992-1998 









Gambia  1994-1998 





Indonesia  1963-1966-1991-2000 
Iraq 1980-1990 
Kenya  1990-1993 
Liberia  1992-1998 
Malawi  1992-1993 
Nicaragua 1977-1980,  1992-1995 
Niger  1996-1997 
Nigeria  1967-70, 1993-1998 
Pakistan 1971,  1979- 
Panama 1987-1990 
Paraguay  1977-1981,1996 
Peru 1968-1974,  1991-1998 
Rwanda  1994-1995 
Romania 1983-1993 
Somalia  1988-1998 
South Africa  1962-1981 




Togo  1992-1994 
Turkey 1974-1978 
Uruguay 1976-1981 
Zaire  1990-1997 
Zambia  1996-1998 
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)  1983-1988 
Notes: Italics denote multilateral sanctions. Some countries 
are included in both extensive and moderate category for 







   2 27 7   
Table 1.1  The impact of sanctions on U.S.-target countries bilateral trade flows 
   Random effects  Fixed effects 
   Coeff. 
Standard 
error P-Value  Coeff. 
Standard 
error P-Value  Coeff. 
Standard 
error P-Value  Coeff. 
Standard 
error P-Value 
                         
LnGDPi  1.96 0.95 0.04 1.98 0.95 0.04 1.99 0.94 0.04 2.02 0.94 0.03 
LnGDPj  0.77  0.09 0 0.76  0.09 0 0.66  0.1  0 0.65  0.1  0 
Ln  POPi  -5.97 3.13 0.06 -5.88 3.13 0.06  -4.9  3.11 0.12 -4.78 3.11 0.13 
Ln  POPj  -0.11 0.12 0.38 -0.09 0.12 0.46 -0.41 0.19 0.03  -0.4  0.19 0.03 
LnDIST -0.81  0.31  0.01  -0.82  0.3  0.01  Dropped 
LMSANC  0.1  0.08 0.23 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.08 0.08 
XSANC  -1.06 0.17  0  -1.05 0.17  0  -0.89 0.17  0  -0.87 0.17  0 
MULTSANC  -0.73 0.14  0  -0.73 0.14  0  -0.82 0.13  0  -0.82 0.13  0 
INTERWAR  - - -  0.01  0.15  0.97  - - - 0  0.15  0.98 
INTRAWAR  - - -  -0.23  0.09  0.01  - - -  -0.23  0.08  0.01 
Constant  66.37  32.81 0.04  64.1 32.86 0.05  44.3 32.49 0.17 41.44  32.54  0.2 
Observations  1876       1876       1876       1876    
R
2 within    0.17       0.17       0.17       0.18    
R
2 between  0.62       0.62       0.58       0.57    
R
2 Overall     0.48        0.48        0.42        0.42      2 28 8 
Table 2.1  The impact on the other G-7 countries bilateral trade 
  Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
 Coeff. 
Standard 
error P-Value  Coeff. 
Standard 
error P-Value  Coeff. 
Standard 
error P-Value  Coeff. 
Standard 
error P-Value 
                           
LnGDPi  0.29 0.05 0.00 0.28 0.05 0.00 0.79 0.07 0.00 0.81 0.68 0.00 
LnGDPj  0.91 0.03 0.00  0.9  0.03 0.00 0.86 0.33 0.00 0.85 0.03 0.00 
Ln  POPi  1.22 0.05 0.00 1.23 0.05 0.00 0.79 0.63 0.00 0.78 0.06 0.00 
Ln  POPj  -0.64 0.06  0.00 -0.58 0.06  0.00 -1.24 0.79 0.00 -1.21 0.08 0.00 
LnDIST  -1.13 0.02  0.00 -1.12 0.23  0.00 -1.15 0.23 0.00 -1.15 0.02 0.00 
LMSANC  0.14 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.03 0.00 
XSANC  -0.71 0.06  0.00 -0.68 0.06  0.00 -0.71 0.06 0.00 -0.69 0.06 0.00 
MULTSANC  -0.97 0.05  0.00 -0.97 0.05  0.00 -0.97 0.05 0.00 -0.97 0.05 0.00 
INTERWAR  -  -  - -0.09  0.05  0.86 -  -  - -0.08  0.05  0.14 
INTRAWAR  -  -  - -0.18  0.03  0.00 -  -  - -0.17  0.03  0.00 
Constant  -19.16 0.62  0.00 -19.93 0.61  0.00 -14.3 0.75  0.00 -14.74 0.75  0.00 
Observations   10950       10950       10950       10950     
R
2 within    0.5       0.5       0.5       0.51    
R
2 between    0.55       0.6       0       0    
R2 Overall     0.52        0.55        0.1        0.11      2 29 9 
 